We propose formalisms and concepts which allow to make precise the m'gmnents in controversies over the adequacy of competing models of language, and over their formal equivalence.
Introduction
It is customary to judge the success of scientific models by their agreement or otherwise with the observed data. For example, linguists require of grammm's that they generate the tight sentences, but also that they correctly classify the sentences and phi'ases as to the categories and constructions they belong to. Our purpose is provide a formal account of the elusive concept of expressive power with respect to the kinds of categories and constructions that a grammar (of a given type) can reflect. The principal concept will be definability of relations in a logical formalism corresponding to a given grarmnar type in this language, specifically definability without the use of disjunction in the defining tbrmula. Our results can be summar~ed as follows:
1. We cast CFGs in a logical formalism. We then progressively enrich the formalism to express the parametrization of categories and of constructions in various ways as well as by allowing metarules and transformations.
2. We then prove a number of theorems about what can and cannot be done in a given formalism, focusing on the definability of categories and constructions (both taken as relations in the logic).
a. Definability is characterized precisely for the first time, and we distinguish various kinds, of which nondisjunctive definability corresponds closely the notion of capturing a linguistic generalization in a grammar.
b. Agreement is not definable in CF theories, but can be defined in theories/grammars with attributes.
c. Constructions whose variants differ in word order and/or in the number of constituents cannot be captured even by CFGs with attributes, but can in slightly' more powerful models.
d. Constructions as above but where the order and/or the number of constituents correlate ('agree') with some other t~ature require inherently more powerful systems.
We show how such patterns can be captured if we parametrize concatenation and the number of constituents (for the first time, something other than categories gets parametrized).
e. The same generalizations can be captured via transformations or metarules. Cn'ammars with transformations and metarules can be treated as particular cases of a certain formal proof system. f.
Various extended notions of definability are considered; for example, the binary relation between pairs of trees related by a metarule or transformation, and the notion of definability across a class of grammars.
Definability

Expressive power
The expressive power of a logical theory depends on four factors: We shall deal mostly with 1,2 and 4, and allow 3 to correspond to a translation into a logical language of the context free part of a grammar. As we have already mentioned, the difference between TGs and MGs has something to do with 4.
Context Free Theories
Using granamars we can talk about which notions cml be defined, or expressed, thereby only in an intuitive sense. The reason for that lies in the fact that '%eing defined/definable" is a property of a predicate, therefore a proper language for studying expressive power of different grammars, and grammatical formalisms is logic. Then we can talk about non-defibility or definability of notions such as Passive(x) or Passive of (x,y) formally, in a logical system. It turns out that definability of such a concept depends on a formal language in which a grammar is written. Thus it may happen that two grammars prove "sentencehood" of the exactly the same classes of strings, but it is possible to define such a predicate in one of those theories and not in the other.
We begin with CFGs. 
Proposition
translation. proves S(s).
I.
Let G be a CFG and G' its A string s belongs to L(G) iff G'
The Undefinability of Agreement
We turn to a simple example, namely, agreement between NPs and VPs. Consider a sample CFT:
In order to prove that agreement cannot be captured here, we need to specify what that would mean. It is easy to show that well-defined relations such as numberagree (number,x,y) or agree (number, x,y) are only definable in CFT if the defining formula.uses disjunction. But traditionally disjunction in grammatical description is a standard notation for two (or more) unrelated phenomena. Thus, disjunction is not forbidden, but when it occurs, it impfies the factual claim about the referents of the disjuncts are distinct linguistic phenomena. In the case before us, that would be saying that singular and plural agreement are not the same phenomenon. It is not, of course, the business of logic to inquire into whether in fact number agreement in some language is a unitary phenomenon. It is rather the business of' logic to provide the tools for the linguist scientist who, on whatever basis, makes such determinations, to capture formally the theories that he develops, Accordingly, we first assume a special notion of definability, defined as follows: ltowever, some categories ttms defined are spurious in that they cannot be used in proving sentencehood. We want to rule these out. Moreover, the notion of 'category' will be analogously restricted. Tiffs allows us to avoid spurious categories as in 2.4 below.
We wil! also refer to constructions which are I.wo~place relations between a grammatical category (the category the construction yields) and a string ,ff grmnmatical categories (which the construction i:; made up of). It is possible to introduce a symbol that corresponds to the category NP, but it c,'mnot be used in deriving sentences from the stm't symbol. Our definition allows such spurious category symbols to appear in formulas of CFT, but at the same time it prevents them from having ~ly iHtluence on what categories are definable in the formalism. This simple example clearly shows that an appeal to intuitions would be insufficent to talk about expressive power of the two grammars. Notice that linguists often do allow categories such as NP, but not constructions (such as the subject-predicate construction or passive) or features of constructions (such as agreement) to be described disjunctively. This is especially true of lexical categories. It is thus instructive that, as shown, the phenomenon of agreement means that certain categories are not definable at all, even with disjunction.
Spurious categories
Some Results Theorem 2. Ira CFT T contains S(x.y) ~-NI'I -atl(x) & VPt -ah(y) S(x.y) ~ NP2 -att(x) & VP2 --at,(y)
Attributes and Constructions
We will talk now about a logic corresponding to CFGs with attributes. We will show that such logics provide an inherently more expressive theory of categories, ahd in particular allow us to define the category NP and VP in a language with number or gender agreement.
However, the use of attributes does not lead to an all-powerful theory of constructions, ,and consequently certain linguistic generalizations are missed by grammars with attributes. This leads to the introduction of more powerful devices. All the formal languages we consider, if not first order, can be formalized as weak second order system in an obvious way.
Word Order and Selection Variation
Attribute theories clearly cannot treat as a single construction two forms with different word order. That is, they cannot &-define a relation R (Cat,x) , where Cat is some grammatical category and x ranges over a set of strings of categories identical except with respect to word order. This defect can be remedied by allowing an ID/LI' tbrmat for rules, which we formalize in a very similar way. Attribute theories also cannot handle variation in selection, i.e., the arity of a construction. This is easily remedied by formalizing the parenthesis notation of BNF which is often used to abbreviate CFG's--when we write, itfformally, a rule like A-,B((~, for example. It is harder, to handle the correlation between some attribute of one element and the presence or absence of some other element. For instance, many analyses of English postulate separate constructions of the VP depending on the class of the verb, e.g., transitive (V NP), ditransitive (V NP NP), transitive-prepositional (V NP PP), and so on. It has also been observed that each of these corresponds to a passive form in which one NP is missing (although a PP of the form by NP is optionally possible instead, this is irrelevant for our purpose). Again, if it were just the presence or absence of the object NP that distinguished the two voices, we could use the parenthesis device. However, the form of the verb also changes from active (e.g. sees) to passive (e.g. is seen). Such phenomena, which can be handled with metarules or transformations, also cannot be handled with attribute grammars.
The problem of the definability of constructions is a more complicated one. The results below have been obtained for formulas of the standard first order language. A correct account of recursion Now, consider an extension of attribute grammars which parametrizes the presence/absence of constituents. Thus, we write rules like, where ont is a parameter controling 'the appearance or absence of an element (i.e., +ont(X) means X appears, -ont(JO that it does not), V
VP-~ [c~ active] ~ ont(NP)
Now we can &-define the different kinds of transitive constructions, by using ont to control whether the object NP is realized (in the active) or null (in the passive). Now, the use of this device allows us to &-define the three different kinds of transitive constructions, but not the passive construction, which still requires disiunction (for the same reason that the active requires disjunction). This is exactly the same as with metarules and transformations (as we will see below). The formalism provides no way of making the verb class attributes (trans, ditrans, trans prep) agree with the number and kind of constituent to the right of the verb (NP vs. NP NP vs. NP PP). Some linguists don't mind this, but we will show below how that can also be done (what is required is a way of making the verb class attribute agree with the number and kind of constituent following the verb).
In order to &-define passive, we would need a more powerful kind of' parameter, which can control the number and kind of constituents, which we call sel
VP-~ X sel
And combining the two (ont and sel), we can describe both the transitive and the passive by a rule like:
However, historically such devices as cone, ont, and sel have been unavailable, and instead, transformations and metarules have been used to obtain essentially the same effect, llence, we proceed to show how the power of these models can be represented
Derivability, WGs and M-grammars [S(x.y), [NP(x), VP(y)]] [NP(u.w), [ADJ(u), NP(w)]]
[ S(u.w.y) , [[NP(u.w) , [ADJ(u) 
, NP(w)]], VP(y)]].
Clearly, with this rule we can prove about a string that it is an S if it is generated by the corresponding context free grammar. In a natural way we can extend this definition of an inference rule to cover attribute grammars: attributes can be treated simply as constraints.
A metarule in an M-grammar such as VP --> X NP//VP[I'AS] --> X (PP) which relates passive and active, can be treated as an inference rule.
[
A transformation in a TG can be understood exactly the s,-une way, as a rule Treel//7'ree2.
We will consider very simple kinds of TGs and MGs, which operate on (sub)trees of depth one. This is enough to capture GPSG use of metarules, but not the fifll power of conventional TG. The more general model will be discussed briefly, but for our purposes it is more convenient sometimes to consider special cases, which make the demonstrations simpler.
The TGs and gr,'unmars with metarules (M-Gs) deal not only with strings but a!so with trees. To compare them we have to use a common formalism. Let q" be a collection of trees (over some alphabet with terminals, non-terminals, and perhaps other symbols), where each tree is a pair [Node, Sons] , where Sore is a list of trees. "Iqaen each rule of a context free grammar can be represerrted as a tree of depth one (the definition of depth being obvious), e.g.
We need now to establish the following interpretation:
• Trees, as defined above, will be intepreted as formulas;
• The rules of proof will be expressed in the Gentzen style: Tree l,Tree2//Tree3 ;
• One of the rules of proof will be substitution, as ill
The difference between TG and grammars with metarules (M-Gs) can be now expressed in the definition of a proof.
• In the case of TGs a proof of a formula I~ is a sequence (P, Q) where • For M-Gs a proof of a formula I'~, is a sequence (PI, Q, P) where 1. PI is a collection of formulas of depth one;
2. Q --formulas/trees obtained by applying metarules;
3. P --formulas/trees obtained by applying the rule of substitution.
These definitions allow us to show that a variety of constructions not allowable by CFG's or attribute grammars are definable by MG's and TG's. Also, we obtain a rather neat characterization of' the similarities and differences between TG's ,and MG's. Let's concentrate on the agreement wrt gender. Notice that the assumption that agreement exists and that it should be somehow expressible in a grammar (using disjunctions or not) is an empirical statement. We could express it formally by augmenting our language with a (higher order) device detecting the presence of a substring 'fern' in a predicate as in
Other Notions of Definability
S(x.y) ~ NP -sing -fern(x) & VP -sing -fern(y).
We will be interested in a subclass of CFT that allow formulas of the sort:
S(x.y) ~ Assuming that we can talk about agreement formally, we can formulate and prove the following fact.
Theorem 6. Agreement with respect to an attribute is not definable across the class CFT of context free theories.
We now see that much stronger results can be achieved across languages than for one language.
For a single CFT, we can only that agreement is not &-definable, but for the CFT's as a class we have just seen that it is not defmable at all.
Conclusions
We proved a' number of results about the expressive power of a number of grammatical formalisms, not just CFGs, but also others that resemble more closely what linguists actually work with. More important, we have proposed a method which can be extended to any class of grammars for characterizing precisely what relations, constructions, and categories this kind of grammar can "capture". In the process, we have clarified the notion of category, defined for the first time the notion of construction, and proposed a number of grammatical devices that have not been considered before, and cast a new light on the problem of the relation of metarules, transformations, and extensions of phrase structure, such as parametrizing categories (i.e., using attributes) and parametrizing constructions. We believe that the crucial step was dealing not directly with grammars but with correspondbag logical theories for such grarmnars, and this will continue to prove fruitful in the future.
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